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Michael Hutter:
Thank you, Rob. Our segment this morning will lead off with
State Constitutional Jurisprudence: Decision Making at the New
York Court of Appeals. Our two speakers will be Vin
Bonventre, 1 from Albany Law School, and Luke Bierman, 2 from
Stockton State College. Both of them, as you know from the
bibliographies and the material, as well as from reading their
material, are two of the more highly regarded scholars with
respect to Court of Appeals decision making, the trends in the
decisions, and the judges themselves.
I think you are going to be highly enlightened by their
discussions and by their comments with respect to where the
1. B.S., Union College; M.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Brooklyn
Law School. Vincent M. Bonventre is a Professor of Law at Albany Law
School.

2. B.A., Colgate University; Ph.D. State University of New York at
Albany; J.D., College of William and Mary. Luke Bierman is a Professor at
Stockton State College.
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Court of Appeals has gone, where it is going and its basic
decision making process.
We will start off by having Vin Bonventre make his
presentation, followed by Luke Bierman, and then we will open it
up for a question and answer period. Again, following up with
respect to what Rob just said, I think we are very much
encouraging the notion here of having questions asked back and
forth. I just do not want to sit up here, and I think Vin and Luke
do not want to sit up here and simply give a rote presentation and
then sit down. We really do want to encourage this interactive
discussion. So, our first speaker, then, will be Vin Bonventre.
Vincent Bonventre:
Thanks, Mike.
Is the New York Court of Appeals an ideological dog and pony
show? That is not me talking, that is the Daily News. 3 The Daily
News wrote an editorial a couple of weeks ago referring to the
Court of Appeals. 4 I guess that I have to agree, the Court of
Appeals certainly is a show for those of us who enjoy observing
it and studying it.
Is it ideological? It certainly is ideological in the sense that the
judges have particular philosophies and values that they bring to
bear in the decision making. And with regard to dogs and ponies,
there certainly are different philosophies and ideologies on the
court. Depending upon what your perspective is, some would be
deemed to be ponies and others would be deemed to be dogs.
Now, the Daily News really was participating in this blizzard
of criticism by the Governor and others against the Court of
Appeals for being too ideological. 5 Of course what he meant was
3. New York Courts: Guilty as Charged, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 28, 1996, at

40 (discussing how the criminal justice system has been negatively impacted by
the New York State Court of Appeals).

4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Paul Schwartzman, Highest State Court on Trial, DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 28, 1996, at 6 (portraying the New York State Court of Appeals as
a "zealous protector of defendant's rights."); Liam Pleven, Pataki Seeks to
Loosen Rules on Search-Seizure, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1996, at A19 (focusing
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that it was being too liberal. 6 It was protecting, in the Governor's

view, the rights of the individual more than it ought.
The Daily News ran this editorial: "New York Courts Guilty as
Charged. " 7 Not only did they call the Court of Appeals this
ideological dog and pony show, but in their full page editorial
they also said, among other things, "this panel's interpretations
of constitutional protections are so convoluted, its investigatory
and evidential restrictions so complicated, even Oliver Wendell
Holmes would have trouble deciphering them."8
Pataki, said that some of the Court of Appeals' decisions were
mindless, irrational and far too liberal. 9 The Wall Street Journal
got into the act when they published an editorial in which they
said, "[t]he liberal judges who make up the majority on the Court
of Appeals, entirely appointed by former Governor Mario
Cuomo, made clear that ideology drives their decisions." 10
Well, the judges themselves have not been immune to
criticizing one another. Judge Bellacosa recently accused his
colleagues of institutional egocentricity because he did not agree
with the majority's result in the 1991 decision, People v.
on Governor Pataki's proposed legislation which would no longer allow a
criminal to "hide behind a technicality or an interpretation" relating to the
Fourth Amendment); John Caher, Court Rulings Conflict with Pataki's
Agenda, ALBANY TNIES-UNION, Jan. 28, 1996 at Al (stating "[in 1995, the
Court issued a smorgasbord of rulings that were philosophically at odds with
the new Republican governor and his conservative agenda.").
6. See Vincent M. Bonventre, New York's Chief Judge Kaye: Her
Separate OpinionsBode Well for Renewed State Constitutionalismat the Court
of Appeals, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1163, 1165-66 n.11 (1994). "Liberal"
generally signifies a preference for, and possibly an extension of, civil rights
and liberties, equal protection or rights of the accused. "Conservative" on the

other hand, signifies a preference for limits on the scope of protection
provided for civil rights and liberties. Id.
7. See supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. John Caher, Pataki Assails Court of Appeals. Liberal Palings are
'Mindless' Safeguardsfor Criminals, He Says, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, Nov.
2, 1995, at Al.

10. Peter Reinharz, Rule of Law: The Court New York Criminals Love,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1996 at A15.
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Harris.11 Even the current Chief Judge, Judith Kaye, in the 1990
decision, People v. Bing, 12 accused the majority of a power play
because she did not agree with the court's decision to overrule a
recent precedent. 13 She was accusing the majority of simply
using their new votes and the changes in membership of the
court, to overrule a precedent they simply did not like. Now, in
reality, of course, judges typically and perhaps out of necessity,
inject their own personal values and principles, wisdom and
philosophy into the cases. So, yes, the court is ideological like
other courts are ideological.
Holmes has said it better than anyone else. He said that when
you read a judge's decision, remember that it is often the
unarticulated, the unconscious, the unacknowledgeable factors
that really were decisive in the case. 14 And Cardozo said, "if you
take an honest judge, an honest judge that's trying honestly to
look at the law," he says, "a judge can still only look at the law,
15
see the law, through her own eyes."
So, yes, I mean the court is ideological in that sense, but
whether the court's decision making resembles a dog and pony
show, something to be ridiculed, may well depend on the partisan

11. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 447, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702,

710 (1991) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority for "reject[ing]
the analysis, wisdom and experience of the United States Supreme Court" and
for "declar[ing] its deviation from [a] United States Supreme Court
decision.").
12. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).

13. Id. (stating that, suspect represented by counsel on pending charge,
cannot, in absence of attorney, be brought in for questioning on a new
unrelated charge, even if suspect is not represented on new charge and, in fact
chooses not to be).
14. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 422 (1881). Holmes
stated that judicial legislating has been largely "the unconscious result of
instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions." Id.
15. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13

(1921) (stating "[w]e may try to see things as objectively as we please . ...
[nione the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own.").
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or ideological bent of the assessor. As one might say, it depends
on whose ox is being gored. 16
What I would like to do this morning is to look at facts, and I
mean the barest facts, talking about the numbers, the decisional
record of the court in recent years, and the voting records of the
judges. Again, my focus is on numbers, for their precision and
their objectivity, understanding, of course, that numbers
themselves are inadequate and they are unable to tell the whole
story, but the numbers are factual, they can not be denied and
they do provide at least a partial picture of reality.
Specifically, I would like to look at the court's ideological
decision in voting numbers for the last two complete years: 1994
and 1995. Then I would like to do some comparing and
contrasting with years in the Wachtler era, 17 in 1990 and 1991.
These were, of course, prior to his downfall and prior perhaps to
the events that lead to his downfall. 18
Let us first take a brief look at the immediate ideological
impact of Wachtler's departure, how a still throttled court
behaved in his absence. I have looked at this before and it is quite
extraordinary, it seems to me, what happened as soon as
Wachtler departed. There was a dramatic change. There was a
dramatic change that simply could not be missed in the court's
voting in the year immediately following his departure, that is
1993. The court went from a voting record in state constitutional
cases, the difficult ones, the controversial ones, the ones where
the judges disagree with one another on issues that are deemed
sufficiently important that they are willing to go public.
The court went from a record of twenty-three percent proindividual rights1 9 for the last three years of the Wachtler era, to
16. Exodus 22:28 "[wlhen an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox
shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall
be clear."
17. Wachtler served as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals
from 1987 to 1992.
18. Judge Wachtler resigned from the bench in 1992.
19. Vincent M. Bonventre, State ConstitutionalAdjudication at the Court

of Appeals, 1990 & 1991: Retrenchment is the Rule, 56 ALB. L. REV. 119.
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fifty percent, more than double, fifty percent pro-individual
rights in the immediate aftermath, that is 1993.
Now, perhaps, what we are seeing is, or what we saw was,
pent up liberal ideological steam that was released when a Chief
Judge who had a very strong pro-government record left the
court. And, in fact, if we contrast Wachtler's record with Kaye's,
during the Wachtler years, that is the last three years of the
Wachtler era, Wachtler's record was sixteen percent proindividual rights, Kaye's was fifty-four percent. So, sixteen
versus fifty-four. Seems to me that is reflected in the dramatic
change in the immediate post-Wachtler era from twenty-three
percent to fifty percent, but the question is: Did this dramatic
ideological change last?
Let us go to the ideological profile of the Kaye court in 1994
and 1993. Take a look at the decisional record, voting records of
the judges, and take a look at the ideological spectrum of the
court. Now, some have said, and I have seen it in the New York
Law Journal, that the court has, at least since the immediate
aftermath of Wachtler's departure, reverted to being somewhat
conservative. And this is largely attributed to the appointment of
Judge Levine 20 on the Court of Appeals who by all accounts is
extraordinarily bright and extraordinarily influential and
extraordinarily capable.
Now, if we look at all the state constitutional decisions of the
Court of Appeals, 1994 and 1995, and I mean everything:
divided, undivided, signed, memos, per curiam, everything, it is
interesting. In 1994 and 1995, the court seemed to dip back to
thirty-four percent pro-individual rights, and, in fact, in 1994 it
142 n. 181 (1992). The terms "pro-government" and "pro-individual" conform
to the terms "conservative" and "liberal" as they are commonly used in
judicial studies. Id.
20. See James Dao, Senate Confirms Judge Levine, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 8,
1993, at B6. Judge Howard A. Levine graduated from Yale Law School and

subsequently spent four years as District Attorney of Schenectady County, ten
years as a family court judge, and twelve years as a Judge for the Appellate

Division. Id. He was unanimously confirmed on September 7, 1993 to the
New York Court of Appeals, filling a vacancy created by Judith S. Kaye's
appointment to Chief Judge. Id.
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seemed to be twenty-nine percent. 1995 seemed to be forty
percent. Thirty-four percent. At least that is a drop from fifty
percent, but it seems to me that it is much more revealing than
that, and much more consistent with the procedure here for us to
look at the non-unanimous decisions. That is, again, where the
issues seem to be troublesome enough, nettlesome enough, where
the issues are important enough that the judges are willing to go
public with their disagreement.
The story there is different and it is very revealing. In 1994 and
1995, of these divided state constitutional decisions involving
fundamental fights and liberties, the court ruled forty-seven
percent of the time for the individual, virtually identical to the
immediate aftermath of Wachtler's departure.
If we look at '94 and '95 separately, it is interesting. In 1994,
that is the first full year of Howard Levine's tenure on the Court
of Appeals, the time from which, I think many of the
observations were being made about his rightward pull on the
court.
If you look at 1994, the court ruled thirty-one percent of the
time for the individual. So there was a drop from 1993 to 1994,
fifty percent to thirty-one percent, but then there was a rebound.
Of course I use the term "rebound." I do not necessarily mean it
was a good or bad thing. I think it is a good thing, but that is not
what I am suggesting with the numbers. It went from thirty-one
percent in '94 to fifty-eight percent in '95.
So that if you take the composite of '94 and '95 again, what we
are talking about is forty-seven percent, again, virtually identical
to the fifty percent immediately after Wachtler's departure. Still
quite a contrast from the twenty-three percent pro-individual
rights during the last three years of Wachtler's tenure.
Let us look at the individual voting records of the judges in
these cases, and again compare them to the voting records in the
immediate aftermath of Wachtler's departure. We find that the
voting record in the last two years of virtually all the judges is
identical, or nearly so, to what it was in the immediate aftermath
of Wachtler's departure. Judge Kaye, fifty-nine percent pro-
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individual rights immediately following Wachtler's departure. In
'94 and '95, fifty-nine percent.
Judge Simons, forty-three percent pro-individual rights.
During the immediate aftermath of Wachtler's departure, fortyfour percent. Thus, '94 and '95 are virtually identical.
Judge Titone, eighty-two percent pro-individual rights.
Following Wachtler's departure, in the last two years, the figure
is actually sixty-seven percent but there is a statistical aberration
there. Let me explain it this way: it was eighty-two percent in
1993 immediately after Wachtler left. In 1994, it was eightyseven percent. In '95 criminal cases, it was eighty percent.
Again, virtually identical. In the civil cases, however, it was
down to thirty-three percent.
And it seems to me from looking at Titone's record over the
last several years, that, that is an aberration. And it seems to me
it may have something to do with the education cases 2 1 and the
22
lesbian adoption case.
21. See City of New York v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 655
N.E.2d 649, 631 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1995). Plaintiffs, including New York City,
and the Board of Education, brought suit against the State challenging the
constitutionality of the States' property taxed based method of funding public
education and held that as municipalities, plaintiffs lacked the legal capacity to
bring suit against the State. Id. at 289, 655 N.E.2d at 651, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
555 (Titone, J., concurring); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New
York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995). Plaintiffs'
claim was based on a failure to provide a sound basic education to school
children in New York city school districts as required by State Constitution.
Id. at 312-13, 655 N.E.2d at 663, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The court found that
the state funding scheme was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest, and did not violate either the Federal or New York State
Constitutions. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.;
R.E.F.I.T. v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551
(1995). -Plaintiffs argued that there was a greater disparity in the amount of
money allocated per student in property-poor districts in relation to students in
property-rich school districts. Id. at 283-284, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 552. Plaintiffs claimed that this disparity indicates a "gross and
glaring inadequacy" in the New York school financing system which raises
constitutional questions. Id. at 284, 655 N.E.2d at 648, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
The court held that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated because
they failed to show that students in the property-poor school districts were
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Bellacosa, seven percent pro-individual rights in the year of
Wachtler's immediate departure. He now is at twenty-five
percent. There has been a change in Bellacosa, and perhaps it is
because his soul mate and friend, Wachtler, is no longer at the
court. I mean I am not sure. I am not sure if I could figure out
that judge's psyche, but in any event he's gone from seven
percent to twenty-five percent. That is not an insignificant
change.
Judge Smith went from fifty-five percent in the last two years,
to fifty-eight percent. Again, virtually the same.
Levine, twenty-two percent. The last two years twenty-two
percent. He has not changed.
Ciparick was not on the court in the first year immediately
following Wachtler's departure, but the last two years her voting
record was sixty-three.
So, in short, every judge's voting record remains virtually
identical except for Bellacosa. That is, we are just talking about
comparing the immediate aftermath of Wachtler's departure and
the last two years. Let me show what we are talking about in
terms of a spectrum here with this aid. This is what we are
talking about.
In '94 and '95, what you have is Titone and again it's sixtyseven percent, but I think if I removed the aberration, it's
seventy-five percent. Again, these are all pro-individual rights.
Ciparick, sixty-three percent. Kaye and Smith, they are close at
fifty-nine and fifty-eight. Then you have the court, the court,
which is at forty-seven percent. And then you have Judge
Simons, who is forty-four percent. And then you have probably
Bellacosa and Levine. Bellacosa coming in at twenty-five and
Levine coming in at twenty-two. That's the spectrum of the
court.
receiving less than a "sound basic education." Id. at 284-85, 655 N.E.2d at
649, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
22. Matter of Dana, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 651
(1995) (holding that under New York Domestic Relations Law, lesbian and

unmarried heterosexual partners may adopt children).
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Now, a few interesting things if we look at the alignments with
the majority. First of all, Judge Kaye, during this period, is in
line with the majority ninety percent of the time. Now, if her
voting record is substantially more pro- individual rights than
Wachtler's, well, that says something.
What about Levine? Levine at one end of the spectrum.
Interestingly in 1994, the first full year he was at the court, and
the first of these two years we are looking at, Levine's alignment
with the majority or vice-versa was ninety-two percent. In 1995,
it dropped to fifty-eight percent. Dropped from ninety-two
percent to fifty-eight percent. Something is going on.
If we look at Judge Titone at the other end of the spectrum, in
1994, he was aligned with the majority or they with him only
twenty-five percent of the time. In 1995, the second year, sixtyeight percent of the time. So much more aligned with Titone.
So what we have here is we have Kaye, and actually in both
those years, 1994 was eighty-five percent alignment and 1995
was ninety-four percent alignment, so that is a total of ninety
percent. It stays high. Kaye's alignment with the majority or
theirs with her is high. Levine is on the decrease. Titone is on the
increase.
What about the alignments and divisions among the judges
themselves? Let us look at Chief Judge Kaye. Judge Kaye was
aligned with Judge Simons, interestingly, eighty percent of the
time. That is the highest of any alignment on the court during '94
and '95: Kaye and Simons.
The same number for Kaye and Ciparick, so she is equally
aligned with Ciparick and with Simons eighty percent of the
time. Her lowest alignment is with Bellacosa, forty-five percent
of the time.
Now let us look at the extremes of the court. Titone and
Bellacosa were near the extreme of the court over there. The
lowest alignment on the court, thirty percent of the time. Those
two in two years agreed with one another only in thirty percent of
the cases. Titone with Levine, only forty-one percent of the time.
So, as you would expect, the alignment is rather low.
What about this? What does this all mean? What about swing
voters and the court as a whole? It seems pretty clear; there is a
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pretty strong pro-government or conservative block over here.
You have a pretty strong pro-individual rights pair over here.
And then hovering around fifty percent, you have these three
judges.
And the interesting thing is that you have Kaye and Ciparick
agreeing with one another quite a bit. You have Kaye and Simons
agreeing with one another quite a bit. And actually alignment
shows that at least for 1995, Kaye agrees with Smith almost
eighty percent of the time.
Let us compare that with what was going on in the Wachtler
court, and now I am going to look at 1990 and 1991. And let me
speed this up and let me tell you what the spectrum looked like in
1990 and 1991.
The bottom line for 1990 and 1991 was that the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of individual rights and divided cases
those two years, twenty-two percent of the time. Twenty-two
percent of the time as opposed to forty-seven. In 1994 and 1995
versus 1990 and 1991, twenty-two percent of the time as opposed
to forty-seven percent of the time. In 1990, it was twenty-two
percent of the time. 1991, it was twenty-one percent of the time.
Virtually identical.
Let us look at how you compare '94 and '95 to '90 and '91.
This is the spectrum of the court. You have Titone in '90 and
'91. Titone, eighty-one percent pro-individual rights. Then you
have the fifty percent mark. And then what you had, is you had
Hancock, 2 3 Kaye, and Alexander bunched together at forty-eight,
forty-seven, and forty-three. And then you had the court. The
court was over here at twenty-two percent. Then you have
Wachtler and Simons, nineteen percent, and sixteen percent. And
then you had Bellacosa, nine percent.

23. See Vincent M. Bonventre, Dedication to the Honorable Stewart F.
Hancock, 9 ToURo L. REV 545, 549 (1993). Judge Hancock's decision making

is generally neither consistently pro-individual or pro-government. Id. His
focus on fundamental fairness and basic reasonableness renders ideologically
free and well balanced decisions. Id. Judge Hancock retired from the bench in

December, 1993. Id.
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Look at the way the court has changed. Look what you have
got here. You had the strong block over here, only Titone is out
here, three judges in the middle or just on the other side of fifty
percent. What's going on? You have Titone by and large the
same, right? Hancock is out of the picture. Alexander is out of
the picture. Kaye goes from forty-seven percent to fifty-nine
percent, so a little more pro-individual rights. Simons, look at
Simons. Look at what has happened to Simons. Simons went
from sixteen percent to forty-four. Very similar figure to what
we saw in the immediate aftermath of Wachtler's departure.
Obviously Wachtler's departure or something happening at
exactly the same time as Wachtler's departure has affected the
voting of Simons. Wachtler is gone. And Bellacosa, look what
has happened to Bellacosa. He went from nine percent to twentyfive percent. Again, something happened either because of
Wachtler's departure or around the time of Wachtler's departure.
But this is what we are talking about. We are talking about a
change in Judge Simons' voting and we are talking about a
change in Bellacosa's voting. And what we are talking about is
instead of a 'pro' block of three, we are talking about a pair. And
instead of just one strongly pro-individual rights judge, we have
got two. And instead of three centrist judges, for lack of a better
term, that are just to the right of center, we now have three, two
of which are to the left of center and one is very close to the
center. We have a somewhat different court.
Last couple of remarks. Obviously, the ranting and the raving
against the Court of Appeals has to be viewed, it seems to me, as
the Governor and other partisans upset with the court and
intending to do something about it. Of course what they could do
about it is replace these judges that they don't like, and replace
them with the ones that they do like.
Well, fortunately or unfortunately, they are not leaving too
soon. Judge Simons is the first one who will be leaving. His term
expires in 1996, and he must retire in 1997.24 So we do not
24. Evan Davis, New York Court of Appeals Roundup, N.Y. L.J. 52 (Sep.
12, 1996). Judge Richard D. Simons' retirement will create a vacancy in the
New York Court of Appeals when he retires on December 31, 1996. Id. Judge
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know whether he's going to leave in 1996 or 1997. We do not
know whether Pataki would extend it for a year.
In any event, he is going to be retiring during Pataki's first
term. In addition, Simons is not on the liberal wing of the court.
There probably will not be too much of a change no matter what
the Governor does in replacing Simons.
Next one to leave: Judge Titone. His term ends 1998. He has
to retire as a matter of age in 1999. We do not know whether the
Governor, whether it is Pataki re-elected or whether it is the next
Governor, would want to extend Titone for that extra year or just
replace him at the end of his term. But, Titone would be the next
one. Obviously if a Governor was to replace Titone with
someone less pro- individual rights than Titone, and that is not
difficult, if the Governor replaces Titone with somebody that is
moderately pro-individual rights, that would be a change.
Say Governor Pataki is re-elected, he has got a second term.
He replaces Titone, who I gather is the bane of his counsel's
office. Judge Titone, if he is replaced by somebody who is as
pro-government, as conservative, as Bellacosa, who the Governor
admires, we are talking about a dramatic shift. This could change
the complexion of the court.
Subsequent to Titone is Bellacosa himself. His term expires in
the year 2000. He does not turn seventy for some years after that,
but his term expires in 2000, which is the next gubernatorial
term. Obviously, if the Governor reappoints him, whoever the
Governor is, nothing changes. If perhaps it is a democratic liberal
governor, who does not care for Bellacosa, and does not care for
him enough so that he will replace him, even though Bellacosa
will be eligible by age to stay on the court, if Bellacosa is
replaced by somebody more liberal than him, that would change
the complexion of the court.
So, what we are talking about is in the very near future Simons
is the only one to leave in this term, but Titone, Bellacosa and
Simons has been a particularly important part of the Court, contributing many
well written and analytically rigorous opinions during his tenure. Id. The
Court will be at a loss if his replacement "lacks his intellectual firepower." Id.
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immediately thereafter, Levine, will be coming up in the next
gubernatorial term. If there is to be increasing scrutiny of the
Court of Appeals' nominees, as apparently there was with
Ciparick, who was deemed to be controversial, then we can
expect partisan and ideological interest and concern. If one is
partisan and if one is ideological, there is good reason for
concern, but we can expect some interest and concern with the
upcoming appointments.
The ideological and philosophical makeup of the court can
certainly be altered, if not in the immediate future, then in the
near future. And it can be altered quite dramatically. Stay tuned.
Thank you.
Michael Hutter:
The next speaker will be Luke Bierman.
Luke Bierman:
Good morning. When my wife found out I was coming back to
Albany Law School she was very concerned. I did not go to
school here, but having worked and lived in Albany for a long
time I had many friends here. I would come over here to play
basketball. Unfortunately, my basketball career ended on this
floor, on that basketball court, when I broke my ankle. I am glad
to see they put up some protection on the wall on which they did
not have back in those old days. My wife was very concerned. If
she knew we were actually on the same floor she would be
appalled and concerned about me as only a wife can be because
then there would be nobody to help her take care of the kids.
Vin's numbers tell part of the story, I think, as he suggested, at
the New York Court of Appeals and with apologies to Paul
Harvey I am sort of here to tell the rest of the story, I think.
It has really been about twenty-five years now since the new
judicial federalism was recognized as judicial phenomenon, and
in that twenty-five years attention was given to how state courts
function. There are a couple of reasons. One is that state courts
were seen as an alternative to an increasingly conservative United
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States Supreme Court. Certainly that is the flavor we get from
Justice Brennan's Harvard Law Review article2 5 and certainly the
perception that was out there, but also state courts were seen as
interesting political institutions involved in policy formation that
had particular institutional characteristics that could be studied to
learn more about these institutions. Certainly what we see with
studies like the Tarr & Porter26 study about New Jersey, Ohio
and Alabama. From this attention over the last twenty-five years
we have learned quite a few things about state courts, things we
did not know before. For instance, state courts are not necessarily
saviors from a conservative United States Supreme Court. State
courts themselves can be quite conservative. Professor Latzer and
Professor Bonventre certainly have made that clear to us. And we
have also seen that state courts, when confronted with particular
issues of state constitutional law can act rather oddly, not the way
they usually act.
Regarding this latter observation that state courts can act rather
oddly, we see a lack of principled decision-making in state
constitutional adjudication. Certainly Professor Gardner
suggested that in some of his writings and others. 27 Professor
Galie and Professor Bonventre have suggested and observed this
lack of consistency that is not present in other kinds of decisionmaking necessarily that state courts do.
We have also seen that despite this independent state
constitutional adjudication there is nonetheless an emphasis in
interpreting state constitutions on federal constitutional law.
25. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death

Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313 (1986).
26. GEORGE A. TARR & MARY C. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE
NATION (1988) (examining the activities of the Alabama, Ohio and New
Jersey Supreme Courts from the end of World War II to the mid-1980's with a
AND

discussion focusing on the interaction between state supreme courts and other
political institutions).
27. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. Rnv. 761, 762 (1991) (discussing the

movement, led by Justice William Brennan, "advocating state independence in
constitutional decision making.").
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Even the state judges themselves have recognized the problems
that state courts confront in state constitutional adjudication.
Judge Kaye, of course, in 1992 in the Scott and Keta cases 28
28. People v. Keta, 142 Misc. 2d 986, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Sup. Ct.
1989), rev'd, 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991), appeal
granted, People v. Scott, 77 N.Y.2d 912, 572 N.E.2d 628, 569 N.Y.S.2d.
945 (1991), rev'd, People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1991), remanded, People v. Keta, 185 A.D.2d 994, 591
N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1992); People v. Scott, 169 A.D.2d 1023, 565
N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991), appeal granted, People v. Scott, 77 N.Y.2d
966, 573 N.E.2d 588, 570 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1991), rev'd, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593
N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992), remanded, People v. Keta, 185
A.D.2d 994, 591 N.Y.S.2d 782 (2d Dep't 1992). In Scott and Keta the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution
can afford greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Scott, the
Chenango County Supreme Court convicted the defendant of criminal
possession of marijuana after law enforcement officials entered the defendant's
open field where he was growing the contraband. 169 A.D.2d at 1024, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 576. Reversing the Appellate Division's affirmation of the
conviction, the New York Court of Appeals held that the search and seizure
were unreasonable. Id. at 1026, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
In Keta, the Queens County Supreme Court suppressed evidence of stolen
vehicles in the defendant's possession obtained through a "routine"
government inspection. 142 Misc. 2d at 993, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The
Appellate Division reversed holding that the search was legal. 165 A.D.2d at
183, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
search violated Article I, §2 of the New York Constitution and suppressed the
evidence. 79 N.Y.2d at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930. The
case was remanded to the Appellate Division where it was affirmed without
opinion. 185 A.D.2d at 994, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by an oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Article I, section 12 of the New York State
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by an oath or
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wrote, "[p]erhaps more than any other issues, state constitutional
law cases over the past decade have seemed to fracture the court.
In state constitutional law cases we have been uncommonly

divided. "29
What is it then about state constitutional cases that promote this
uncharacteristic dissent and disagreement at the New York Court
of Appeals? And perhaps the first question is whether it really is
uncharacteristic? What I sought to do in the paper that I wrote 30
examines the court of appeals' decision-making in its plenary
case load compared to what I call the judicial federalism cases,
one, to identify whether there are differences in these particular
subject areas, and also to try to identify any characteristics or
contributions to any differences that may exist.
Before we look at the plenary case law and the judicial
federalism cases, I think it is important to recognize as sort of
setting a parameter that the court of appeals decides almost all of
its cases without any dispute. 3 1 By that I mean there are literally
32
hundreds of cases every year that the court of appeals decides.
These cases include applications in criminal cases and the
motions in civil cases that the court of appeals denies.
There appears to be a general consensus about the court of
appeals' decision-making. Just think what one wayward judge
could do to that court in criminal applications. If he started
granting applications left and right, the court would be inundated
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
.N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
29. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 503, 593 N.E.2d at 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 938
(1992) (Kaye, J., concurring). See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564
N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1219 (1991)
(holding a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are present in an apartment is
sufficient to support the police exercising a warrantless search).
30. LUKE BIERMAN, Horizontal Pressures and Vertical Tensions: State
ConstitutionalDiscordancy at The New York Court of Appeals, 12 TouRo L.
REv. 633 (1995).
31. Id.at 639.

32. Id.at 671 (explaining that the New York Court of Appeals decided
618 cases during the 1994-95 term).
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and it is up to one judge to make the decision. Even new judges
seem to comport quite quickly to the standard operating
procedures. We do not do that.
In the civil case load on motions, two judges could very easily
inundate the court with cases. Their case load remains constant,
around 300, 250 in that general range. It would be quite easy for
one or two rebellious judges to simply inundate the court with
work, but we do not see that. In fact what we see is that most
cases are decided consensually and civilly.
This is the practice we see in the plenary case load. We look at
the plenary case load, what we see is much consensus and civility
among the judges. I attribute that to what I characterize as
horizontal pressures, which are internal dynamics that affect the
way the court interacts or the judges interact among themselves.
In the judicial federalism cases, 33 we see something different.
We see no -- or a lack of consensus, not no consensus, but much
less consensus, much less civility. The cases are resolved with
much more discordancy.
I suggest this is related to an outside pressure, that of the
United States Supreme Court, in vertical tension that is exerted,
rather than the more prevalent horizontal pressures that are
present in the court's plenary case load. What I did is look at five
years of the plenary case load and identified judicial federalism
cases prior to Chief Judge Kaye's observation at the end of the
'92 term. 34
What I looked at was the '87 to '92 terms at the court of
appeals. I also looked at the most recent complete term: '94, '95.
That is the first term since the turnover in the early '90's with the
same natural court for a full term. In other words, there were
notes in the first term where there were no changes in personnel.
That is the most recent term that has been completed.
The addition of three new judges during that later term will
help us to see whether any characteristics were time bound or
33. See LUKE BIERMAN, The Dynamics of State Constitutional DecisionMaking: Judicial Behavior at the New York Court of Appeals, 68 TEMP. L.
REV.

1403 (1995).

34. See

BIERMAN,

supra note30, at 671.
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whether there was some crossover that was not time bound to a
particular era or particular terms. The plenary case load I
defined, and I looked at all the cases decided with either opinions
or memoranda, sort of the general idea of what the plenary case
load is, cases that were dealt with by the court at least greater
than just the motions and applications.
And the judicial federalism cases I defined as cases where the
court was uniquely and clearly presented with issues of state
constitutional adjudication against a federal constitutional
35
doctrine.
What should the standard be under the state constitution? Let
me turn first to the plenary case load. What I found is that in the
plenary case load most cases were decided with a single
opinion. 36 During the '87 to '92 terms this occurred between
37
seventy-eight percent and eighty-seven percent of the time.
Around eighty, eighty-five percent of the time the court is
38
deciding cases in one opinion.
With regard to 1994-95, right around the same amount, eightythree percent. 39 One opinion for the court. The court speaking as
unanimous in one opinion about eighty, eighty-five percent of the
time. 40
Looking at it a little differently, the cases where all the judges
agreed to a particular outcome, might be concurrences, but the
outcome they agree about is even more. 4 1 The agreement in 1987
to 1992 runs as high as ninety percent in 1994. In 1995, it was
about eighty-six percent. 42 What we see is a great deal of
consensus. I do not know about you, but I have trouble agreeing
35. BIERMAN, Horizontal Pressures and Vertical Tensions: State
ConstitutionalDiscordancy at The New York Court of Appeals, 12 ToURo L.
REv. at 640.

36. Id. at 634.
37. Id. at 638-39.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 639.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
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with my wife what to have for dinner most nights. These folks
are deciding cases consensually in the plenary case load around
eighty-five percent of the time. 43 They are agreeing to a majority
statement, they are agreeing to the rationale, and in ninety
percent of the time, almost ninety percent of the time, they are
44
agreeing to the outcome.
This suggests that there are high rates of consensus and high
rates of civility at the court of appeals. These rates are as high as
ever seen at the United States Supreme Court, which occurred in
the early 1800's under John Marshall, where there was around
eighty-five percent unanimity.
The continuation of these high rates suggest that this high
consensus, is not time bound. This is not something that was just
present for a particular group. It also does not seem to be related
to how the judges were chosen, since some of the judges during
the 1987 term and through the 1992 term had been elected, at
least initially, Wachtler, 45 for instance, and it also suggests that it
is not related to jurisdictional pressures, such as the change in
1985 when the court got significantly greater discretion over its
case load.
I would point out that in other time periods that I looked at,
there was similar consensus at the court of appeals during the
early '80's. So, again, we see some of the suggestion that this is
not time bound. If it is not time bound, my observation would be
that it is something about the court itself.
There are some horizontal pressures, some internal
expectations, about how the court of appeals is supposed to act
that contributes to this high rate of consensus and civility at the
court. One of these factors I would suggest is leadership. The
court of appeals has traditionally had quite strong Chief Judges.
Cardozo, 46 during his time period, the early twentieth century,
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Bierman, supra note 30, at 637, n. 12, 646 (noting that Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler resigned following his arrest on federal felony charges).
46. Benjamin N. Cardozo was appointed to serve as Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals in 1926 and was appointed by President Hoover
in 1932 to the United States Supreme Court.
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there was little dissent at the court of appeals. 4 7 Most cases were
decided consensually and, as people have observed, there was not
a whole lot of hostility in what few dissents there were.
Consensus and civility.
Chief Judge Fuld4 8 in his articles and writings about dissent
indicated they were expected to be few. You were supposed to
present a uniform appearance for institutional strength to the
court.

Breite14 9 was characterized as offering what Wachtler in his
tribute said "rough fondling" in order to promote a united front
for the court to reach particular results, unanimous results. 50
Wachtler, during the '87-'92 term, was seen as a Chief Judge
highly committed to consensus and civility on the court as
important for institutional factors. He was recognized as a
charming, eloquent, dominant force, at least at the beginning of
the term as Chief Judge. His personality permeated the court, but
perhaps more importantly, during this time period that I looked
at, he was very senior on the court. He had served fourteen years
as an associate judge, two years as Chief Judge, when the next
most senior judge on the court had been there only four years,
Simons, 5 1 having been appointed in '83, this being 1987. There
was much opportunity for leadership from the Chief Judge
consistent with how the court of appeals was supposed to act.

47. See A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 271 (1986).

48. Stanley H. Fuld was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals as
an Associate Justice in 1967 and was appointed Chief Justice in 1967.
49. Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel joined the New York Court of Appeals
in 1966 and retired in 1978 after serving, for five years, as chief judge.
50. Sol Wachtler, A ChiefJudge Remembers, N.Y. L.J., January 8, 1992,

at 2. In an essay written for a memorial speech for former Chief Judge Breitel.
former Chief Judge Vachtler explained "[o]nce when I complained about
[Breitel's] persistent methods he said I should not mistake harshness for a lack
of affection and regard, he said he was guilty of no more than 'rough
fondling'." Id.

51. Judge Richard D. Simons was appointed to the New York Court of
Appeals in 1983.
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In addition, there was significant opportunity for influence
among the judges, how they interacted, as William Brennan has
been suggested as being influential at the United States Supreme
Court. 5 2 There was an ability to persuade people to reach a
particular result.
Vin has suggested during the earlier period there was a three
judge bloc. My work also suggests during this period there was a
very strong bloc between Wachtler, Simons and Bellacosa that
53
made it easier for the others to come to agreement with them.
Wachtler was sort of the elder statesman on the court. He had
been there the longest, strong intellect, popular among the court,
at least at the beginning. Simons, the respected senior associate
judge, and Bellacosa, as a friend of the Governor, and the Chief
Judge and criminal law commentator. A significant variety of
pressures from within to render influence upon the other
members of the court. And perhaps most importantly are the
concepts associated with socialization, pressures to conform their
conduct to particular norms of how the court of appeals operates.
The court of appeals has traditions about doing things in
particular ways, and certainly civility, consensus and deference
are among those. There is traditionally high rates of affirmance,
deference to other courts, to the lower courts and few dissents.
What few dissents there were offered in more general tones.
There was not a lot of brow beating in the dissents.
This can be seen from the experiences of the judges between
'87 and '92. Five of the seven judges during this period were
54
lower court judges, four of them at the appellate division.
52. See supra note 30, at 648 (explaining that "Justice William Brennan's
'stature' derives from 'the way he enabled others charged with writing an
opinion for the Court to bring a majority together or hold it together.., and
in the way he led so much of the discussion within the Court on the issues that
served as the cornerstones of major Supreme Court pronouncements."').
53. Id. (discussing Judge Bellacosa, Bierman states, "[h]is preferences
during the 1987-92 terms placed him on a conservative block with Wachtler
and Simons.") Id.
54. See BIERMAN, supra note 30. As career judges in the New York State
judiciary, the court of appeals judges during the 1987-92 and 1994-95 terms
have had extensive experience in the lower echelons of the state judiciary. Of
the ten court of appeals judges during these terms, six have served on the
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There is a professional maturity that occurred for these judges in
the judiciary with the traditions of the court of appeals.
They were deferential to each other as lower court judges,
deferential to the court of appeals itself as lower court judges,
and the lower appellate courts in New York in particular have
high rates of unanimity, as high as ninety-eight percent in some
cases. In other words, there is this idea that they are supposed to
be enacted in this manner: consensually and civilly.
One of the seven, Judge Kaye, had been a lawyer who had to
comport herself as a practicing lawyer, no judicial experience
when she first came to the court, to follow the processes that are
affiliated with being a lawyer and arguing as a litigator to a
court. 5 5

The one who is different, whose professional experiences was
different, was Judge Bellacosa. 56 He had a dissimilar experience
with collegiality, unlike the others. His professional experience
was in non-judicial leadership roles. He was a law clerk to a
presiding justice. He was an academic dean at a law school in a
leadership role, and perhaps importantly he was chief counsel and
clerk to the court of appeals and the Chief Administrative Judge.
Each of these kinds of experiences did not provide him with the
same kind of experiences that the others had in collegiality and
socialization to the prevailing factors at the court of appeals. We
see that in uncharacteristic dissents by Bellacosa. Uncharacteristic
for the court of appeals. Using, for instance, in Boreali,57 an
exclamation mark. We usually do not see judges use exclamation
Appellate Division, New York's intermediate court, and three others have

served as judges on New York's state trial courts. Id. at 653-54.
55. Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye was appointed to the court of appeals as an
associate judge in 1983. In 1993, she became the first female Chief Justice of
the New York Court of Appeals.
56. Judge Joseph Bellacosa was appointed to the New York Court of
Appeals in 1987.
57. Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 19, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1360, 523
N.Y.S.2d 464, 474 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Judge Bellacosa stated

that

"[i]f

the

greater

power

exists,

the

lesser,

as

responsibly

exercised... should not be forbidden!" Id.
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points in opinions. Bellacosa did that shortly after he joined the
bench.
In Luperon,58 a more recent case, Judge Bellacosa, dissenting

from the dismissal of indictment, accused the majority of burying
their heads like ostriches in the sand. 5 9 This isn't the collegial

kind of language that you expect from a court that has high
civility. So these horizontal pressures promote the uniformity, the
consensus and civility that we see in resolving most cases, the
plenary case load.
If we turn to the judicial federalism cases, 60 we see different
decision-making characteristics. In the judicial federalism cases

during this period, '87 to '92, there is only about twenty-five
percent unanimity, consensus. That is far different from the
almost ninety percent we saw in the plenary case load.
In the '94-'95 term, taking the education cases, 6 1 we see in the
62
main education case four different opinions from six judges.

That is highly unusual in the court of appeals. If there is a
dissent, there is one dissent. It usually does not operate in that
58. People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 647 N.E.2d 1243, 623 N.Y.S.2d
725 (1992).
59. Id. at 84, 647 N.E.2d at 1250, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 742 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority twists the holdings and application of those cases
and dangles a distinction without any legal differences as a justification for the
courts, burying their heads like ostriches against the realistic appraisal of what
is 'going down' in these cases . . . . ") Id. at 87 n.1, 647 N.E.2d at 1252 n.l,
623 N.Y.S.2d at 744 n.I.
60. "In the five terms between 1987 and 1992, the court of appeals
decided 30 judicial federalism cases." BIERMAN, 12 ToURo L. REv. at 640.
"Judicial federalism cases are those in which the court of appeals specifically
addressed whether to adopt a federal constitutional doctrine or to define a
distinct rule as a matter of state constitutional law." Id. at 638.
61. See City of New York v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 655
N.E.2d 649, 631 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1995); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565,
(1995); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 86
N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995).
62. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d
307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995) (Judge Ciparick wrote the
majority opinion, Judge Levine filed a concurring opinion and Judges Simons
and Smith each filed dissenting opinions).
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way. It is very different from how the court of appeals resolves
the plenary case load, indicating that Chief Judge Kaye's
comments were quite accurate. The court approaches these cases
differently.
So what is it? I would suggest that it is vertical tensions from
the Supreme Court that are not usually present. Usually there is
no tension in the plenary case load from the outside. Usually the
court of appeals perceives itself as the final arbiter of state law.
With tort law, contracts and the interpretation of state statutes,
the New York Court of Appeals generally does not go outside of
New York to resolve those issues. It attempts to resolve those
issues as the preeminent state court in the country. Certainly
citation studies show that the court of appeals during this century
has been the most influential court, rather than the other way
around. The court does not need to and generally does not go
outside to resolve questions of state law.
State constitutional questions should be decided in much the
same way. And they are uniquely New York. It does not matter
63
what other people have to say. But the judicial federalism cases
place the court of appeals in an unusual situation. They consider
state constitutional law within the context of federal constitutional
doctrine and direction from the United States Supreme Court. In
this aspect, the court of appeals is not considered, perhaps,
rightly or wrongly, the top of the judicial pyramid.
If we think about how courts generally are presented, we have
the Supreme Court up top and then sort of the dual court system
that we recognize with the State Supreme Court below it and the
state intermediate appellate courts and state trial courts and the
United States Court of Appeals on the other side below the
Supreme Court and the trial and the federal district court below
that. The idea being that the state supreme court is sort of
identical to the United States Court of Appeals. I am sure you
can all think of charts that you have seen, standard textbooks,
that represent the court system that way.

63. See id.
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One of my students gave me a document he took out of a
business law course. It shows the hierarchy of the law. I can just
give it to you. The United States Constitution is way up here and
then there are treaties and federal statutes below that. Federal
administrative law below that. Federal common law below that.
Finally we get to state constitutions, state statutes, state
administrative law and state common law way at the bottom.
We know this is sort of not the way it really works. There is
really more of a dual process. If we are going to represent these
things, maybe the United States Constitution should be half a
block over from the State Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court half a block ahead of State Supreme Courts,
because they are independent with regard to state law, but this
seems to get lost.
We see that in some of the writings at the court of appeals. For
instance, in Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski,64 it is a case that
was trying to decide the extent to which a letter to the editor
expressing an opinion is subject to an action for defamation. The
court of appeals originally decides the letter was insulated from
65
action under federal and state constitutional law.
The case gets appealed to the Supreme Court. 66 The Supreme
Court vacates and remands 67 with a direction for further
64. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,

500 U.S. 954 (1991). The New York Court of Appeals concluded that
"protection afforded by the guarantees of free press and speech in the New

York Constitution is often broader than the minimum required by the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914. The
court held that the immediate context and the broader social context in which a

published statement was made should be considered in determining whether the
statement is one conveying opinion or fact. Id. at 256, 567 N.E.2d at 1270,

566 N.Y.S.2d at 918. This case further articulates New York's historical
interest in providing the environment for the free exchange of ideas. Id. at
250, 567 N.E.2d at 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
65. 77 N.Y.2d at 252-53, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916
(finding that letters to newspapers may be the only available opportunity for
public citizens to freely write and express their ideas).
66. Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990) (vacating
judgment and remanding the case to the New York Court of Appeals as a

matter of comity so that it may be reconsidered in light of Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)).
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consideration in light of a subsequent Supreme Court decision. 6 8
The court of appeals goes back and uses United States
Constitutional Law first and then as an independent ground for
State Constitutional determination they decide that the federal
standard provides protection but the state standard is even more
protective.69 The majority justifies the dual constitutional
70
analysis because the United States Supreme Court mandated it.
71
It said remand and reconsider.

Simons' concurrence in this case suggests that the court of
appeals is really little more than an intermediate appellate court in
the federal decision-making process. 72 The court of appeals in
this perspective is not seen at the top of the heap in the national
judicial hierarchy. It takes marching orders from the Supreme
Court.

This tension from the outside is not usually associated in the
plenary case load. The court of appeals does not decide cases
with regard to outside pressure, for example, by looking at what
67. InununoAG, 497 U.S. at 1021.
68. Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that there is no separate
constitutional privilege for statements that may be opinions and that statements
on public matters must be proved false before they are actionable by requiring
a determination of whether they are matters of opinion or fact).
69. Immuno AG, 77 N.Y.2d at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
913 (explaining that "the Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution fix[es
only the minimum standards applicable throughout the Nation, and the State
courts supplement[s] those standards to meet local needs and expectations.").
70. Id. at 239, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (stating that
"[o]n plaintiff's petition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated our judgment,
and remanded the case for further
consideration .... ").
71. Id.
72. Id. at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Simons, J.,
concurring). Justice Simons explains that although the court of appeals is the
highest court in the state, in the federal judicial system it acts as an appellate
court, stating that "[w]hen the Court [of Appeals] reviews a question of
Federal constitutional law, however, it acts as part of a larger judicial system
embracing not only New York but the Nation as a whole. When Federal
questions are presented, its institutional functions are subordinated to the
Supreme Court and it acts, in effect as an intermediate court." Id. at 260-61,
567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
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is Wyoming doing. They do not usually do that. The tension is
being introduced from above and outside. We see it even in other
cases, even cases that are said to be highly supportive of
independent state constitutionalism.
The Scott and Keta cases, 73 for example, are the two cases that
dealt with questions about the open fields doctrine administrative
search. 74 The searches are permissible without a warrant under
the Federal Constitution. 75 The question was what is permissible
under the New York State Constitution. 7 6 The court of appeals
decided under the state constitution that these are unconstitutional
searches without a warrant and the majority relied on unique state
77
protection for citizens.

73. See supra note 28.
74. People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 478, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1330, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1995) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984)). The open fields doctrine provides "that in areas outside the curtilage,
an owner of 'open fields' enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection. This is
so... even for secluded lands and notwithstanding efforts of the owner to
exclude the public by erecting fences or posting 'No Trespassing"signs." Id.
Citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the court of appeals noted
that the Supreme Court held that provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
statutes that provide for warrantless administrative searches of auto
dismantling shops do not violate the protection of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 492-93, 593
N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
75. Id. at 482-83, 593 N.E.2d at 1333, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 925. The
Supreme Court allowed open field searches based on the literal language of the
Fourth Amendment which provides protection to the people "in their persons,
houses, papers and effects." Id. (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177). In allowing
warrantless administrative searches, the Supreme Court "stressed that the state
had a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle dismantling industry ... "
Id.
76. Id. at 495-96, 593 N.E.2d at 1341, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 933. The New
York Court of Appeals is not "bound by decisions of the Supreme Court
construing similar provisions of the Federal Constitution" when interpreting
State Constitutional provisions. Id.
77. See generally Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d
920. Under the New York State Constitution both open-fields searches and
warrantless administrative searches have been held to be unconstitutional.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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This is the case in Bellacosa's dissent where he accuses the
majority of rejecting uniformity of federal and state law,
discarding the Supreme Court's definition, and propelling the
78
court in an articles of confederation type argument.
The concerns noted the discordancy of the state constitutional
adjudication but defends it anyway. However, the way the court
of appeals defends it, although perhaps eloquent on some levels,
relies on the Supreme Court, by saying it is okay for state courts
to decide state constitutional questions independently in some
instances.
Why? Because states are laboratories. Laboratories for what?
The federal government. That does not ring true to strong
independent state constitutions that the idea that the federal
government inhibits state constitutionalism.
79
In the recent term where we saw the education cases,
namely, Campaignfor Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 80 in
which, of course, there was a challenge to the public school
funding under the state constitution education clause, 8 1 and the
Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses. 82 The Federal Equal
78. Id. at 506-7, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).

79. Reform. Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 152
Misc. 2d 714, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1991), appeal transferred, 80 N.Y.2d 801,
599 N.E.2d 689, 587 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1992), afftd, 199 A.D.2d 488, 606
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1993), aff'd, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d
551 (1995); City of New York v. State of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 812, 647
N.E.2d 120, 622 N.Y.S.2d 914, aff'd, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 655 N.E.2d 649, 631

N.Y.S.2d 553 (1995), aff'd, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New
York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
80. 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (holding that
under a rational basis review, the state's educational financing system, based

on funding from property taxes, was rationally related to its legitimate interest
in controlling education on a local level).
81. N.Y. CONsr. art. XI, § 1. Article XI, section 1 provides in pertinent
part: "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a

system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated." Id. This section is often referred to as the "Education Clause."
82. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
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Protection challenge was rejected by the court five to one, no
Federal Equal Protection clause. 83 The state equal protection
challenge was also rejected by the court four to two, but it was
resolved in terms and with the language of Federal Constitutional
precedent in the dissent. 84
Smith's dissent uses language of the Federal Constitution,

discriminatory intent, discriminatory in fact, and relies heavily on

85
all of the United States Supreme Court cases dealing with this.

equal protection of the laws." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section
provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." Id.
83. Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 668,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 572 (Smith, J., dissenting) (relying on Nyquist, the majority
concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations that the state's school financing
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions should be dismissed, where Judge Smith found that plaintiffs
stated a valid equal protection claim under the Federal Constitution).
84. Id. Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa and Levine concluded that the
action alleging that the State's school financing scheme violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the State Constitution must be dismissed in light of the
court's decision in Levittown Union Free Sch. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439
N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), where the court adopted the reasoning
of San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Levittown,
the court of appeals determined that the rational basis test was the appropriate
standard of review under the Federal and the New York State Constitutions for
an equal protection claim against a state school's funding system. Levittown,
57 N.Y.2d at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. In Rodriguez, the
United States Supreme Court found that "[s]ubstantial interdistrict disparities
in school expenditures . . . still exist . . . ." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 15. The
United States Supreme Court further held that "[t]he constitutional standard
under Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest ...." Id. at 55 (citing McGinns
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)). Accordingly, the majority in
Campaign for Fiscal Equity recognized that rational basis review should be
used in determining claims of equal protection. Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
86 N.Y:2d at 320, 655 N.E.2d at 688, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
85. Id. 86 N.Y.2d at 344-49, 655 N.E.2d at 683-86, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
587-89. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied on case law handed
down from the United States Supreme Court. See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1025 (1978), aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that "official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact . . ." where "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent
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This is a state constitutional question. And these differences can
also be seen in the sort of disrespect or perhaps lack of

understanding of state constitutional adjudication that can be seen
in the way that the court got rid of or rejected the state
constitutional equal protection claim. 86

Judge Ciparick wrote an opinion for the court, which is
identified as the majority opinion. 87 In that opinion Judge
Ciparick rejects, or there is a paragraph rejecting, the state equal

protection claim, an argument that Judge Ciparick does not even
agree with. 8 8 She is with the dissent on the state equal protection
claim. 89 They throw this resolution to the state equal protection
issue in Ciparick's opinion that she does not even agree with.90
It is just sort of this weird kind of resolution of an issue in one
paragraph without a great deal of discussion. However, it is part
of a majority statement that the person writing the majority

or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause");
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the constitution").
Additionally, the New York Court of Appeals relied on People v. New York
City Transit Auth., 59 N.Y.2d 343, 350, 452 N.E.2d 316, 319, 465 N.Y.S.2d
502, 505 (1983) (stating that a cause of action, under the New York State
Constitution, for an equal protection violation, requires a showing of
"purposeful discrimination [a]s a necessary element").
86. Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 320, 655 N.E.2d at 66869, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73 (finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish
discriminatory intent which is necessary in an equal protection cause of action
based upon disproportionate impact upon a suspect class).
87. Id. at 333, 655 N.E.2d at 676, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
88. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572. "Judge[s] Smith
and [Ciparick] respectfully disagree [with the dissent] and would sustain
the ... cause of action under the State Constitution. ... " Id. Judges Smith,
in dissent, and Ciparick, in the majority, agreed that "New York's historical
and constitutional commitment to public education establishes as an integral
and substantial right of every citizen in our State, and a heightened level of
scrutiny should be applied to review the... financing [of] public education."
Id. at 355, 655 N.E.2d at 689, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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doesn't even agree with. 9 1 That's hardly greatly respectful of
state constitutional adjudication. It hardly bodes well for
intelligent, independent state constitutionalism, and it reflects,
again, the focus that the United States Supreme Court plays on
resolving state constitutional issues.
The irony is that the New York Court of Appeals does have
complete control over state constitutional issues. The court can
resolve it however it wants. We see this done in the resolution of
the education clause issue in that case where they resolve the
education clause issue without discussing the other states or the
Federal Constitution. 92 They treat the State Constitution as an
independent source not subject to influence, even though this is
an issue that has been dealt with in many courts across the
country. They treat the issue as their own, which they do not do
in these particular judicial federalism issues.
So what we see is that in the plenary case load, there are
horizontal pressures from within the court, things like leadership,
influence, and socialization that produce widespread consensus
and civility. In the more narrow judicial federalism cases we see
tensions exerted from the outside. We see the United States
Supreme Court exerting influence and the judges not really
knowing or understanding or exercising the kind of independence
that they usually are able to show in resolving state law
questions. They ignore the realities of state constitutional
adjudication.
The New York State Constitution predates the Federal
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court has no
authoritative power over state law. The independence of states
requires unique and independent state approaches which the New
York Court of Appeals has so far been unable to really come up
with.

91. Id. at 355, 655 N.E.2d at 689, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 593.

92. See generally Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 337, 665
N.E.2d at 678, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (indicating in dissent that the state
contributions in New York public school system exceeded those of states when
compared against the fiscal contributions of other states toward their respective
public schools).
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One conclusory paragraph on the state equal protection cases:
the opinion of the judge who does not agree with the result is
hardly showing independent respect for state constitutionalism.
As states continue to deal more with important issues under the
State Constitution, particularly in death penalty cases, it is
necessary for the courts to come to grips with the issue in a way
that they have not done thus far.
Thanks.
Michael Hutter:
Thank you. I would like to open it up for questions, comments
from the audience.
Barry Latzer:
I have some questions for you Luke. I think you are leaving out
a part of the story that gives me some sympathy for the court.
First of all, let us take the Scott and Keta cases, 93 which are
among the list of new federalism cases that you deal with. These
cases are search and seizure cases, so you are dealing with an
area of the law where the New York State provision reads
virtually the same as the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 94 You are dealing in an area of the law where the
United States Supreme Court has made a number of rules already
and laws already established. You are dealing in an area of the
law where the law is almost totally confused and very difficult to
figure out if you just stop with the federal constitutional rule.
In light of all that, I do not blame the judges on the court of
appeals for fighting about whether they should now add their two
cents and change the law by coming up with some different state
constitutional rule.
It seems to me if you consider the fact that the state provisions
and the state Bill of Rights 95 are similar to the Federal
93. See supra note 28.
94. Id.
95. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-18.
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Constitutional Bill of Rights, 96 and consider the fact there is
already Federal Constitutional Law established in this area, and
the fact that law is already a mess and confused enough, it seems
to me that it is perfectly understandable that there should be
dissents and conflict on the court of appeals before going out on a
limb and create new law in this area.
The point of my remark is that you seem to a little too hard on
the court. I think it is perfectly understandable that they do not
treat state constitutional law in a vacuum because it does not exist
in a vacuum. It exists in a situation where you already have
federal constitutional law on the subject.
Luke Bierman:
My concern is not that they do not treat it in a vacuum. My
concern is that they seem to be able to do that in other kinds of
cases and they seem to recognize the primacy of New York
independence. We get to decide the case.
My concern is that they begin from the premise of there is this
federal law out there, this Federal Constitutional Law out there
we somehow have to deal with. If it is so confusing or mucked
up why do not they just say "We are going to say what it is for
New York, we do not care what anybody else has done," which
is sort of what they do in other instances, and the other issues,
other cases. They do not deal with constitutional issues so much.
This is New York. This is the way we deal with the problems.
That they do not seem to do. They begin from this idea of there
is all this federal stuff out there and we need to deal with it. Do
they? Aside from the floor, the minimum, that is established,
beyond that, do they need to talk about it? If it is mucked up, as
you suggest, why do not they straighten it out as New York law?
Barry Latzer:
May I respond?
Michael Hutter:
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
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Yes. Most certainly.
Barry Latzer:
My answer to that, at least in the criminal procedure area, is
that the courts in New York and the police in New York and the
defense attorneys and prosecutors in New York have to follow
the federal constitutional rules until the New York Court of
Appeals changes those rules. And if you do change them, it
unsettles the law. It really changes things. It confuses things, it
makes things more difficult.
They are not writing on a blank slate here. It's not as if they
are coming in and making law in an area where there has been no
law. They are changing it. I guess that's the key to the whole
thing. They are really changing the law. We are not talking about
an area where there is no law, we are talking about an area where
there already is law.
Luke Biennan:
That has not stopped courts in other areas. The United States
Supreme Court in the last thirty years has changed the law a
couple of different ways and police had to comport their behavior
and others had to comport their behavior. That is what courts do.
They make policy.
Peter Galie:
I am going to follow up on Barry's question. As someone has
written in defense of state independence, your model seems to go
in the other extreme. You seem to be suggesting that I want the
New York Court of Appeals to act as if New York were the only
place and there were no other states or federal government.
For example, you say they did not cite state precedents in the
education cases. My understanding is that the state courts have
always cited other states, looking to sister states for information,
which is relative. As to the federal precedents you seem to
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suggest that we want the court to look at its own case load, its
own history, forget the rest of the nation.
You talk about putting one's head in the sand. 97 We cannot
ignore the tremendous impact the Supreme Court had on the
national consensus about rights. The difficulty the state courts
have is they must function in that context, whatever the
theoretical argument is about Vanaugh or the independence of
State Constitution. That is what creates a problem.
Let me suggest the other problem and why I have some
sympathy with the court of appeals even though I have criticized
it. Let me suggest why I think the court is not going to work in
the way you would like it to work. The primacy model assumes
that we start with the State Constitution. 98 If we can settle on
state grounds we do not even look at the federal question. That is
the first step. Second, we do our own analysis and we pretend
there are three tiers of scrutiny 99 and protection did not exist
because that would constitute an infection. We are going to look
at it independently and anew. We want to do New York analysis.
Then we use our own precedence and decide the case on state
grounds if we can do so consistent with federal law, and we stop
right there.

97. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
98. See Daniel Gordon, Good Intentions--Questionable Results: Florida
Tries The Primacy Model, 18 Nova L. Rev. 759, 761 (1994).

Under the primacy model, a state court develops its own independent
doctrines under the state constitution and turns to federal law only when state
doctrine does not resolve the issue. Id. Thereby avoiding utilization of the

Federal Constitution until the state constitution fails to protect an activity
protected by the Federal Constitution. Id. Furthermore, state courts applying a

primacy approach remove themselves from reliance on the Federal Constitution
as the basic protector of individual rights. Id This has the effect of avoiding
the relegation of state constitutions to the level of protecting rights only when
the Federal Constitution fails to do so. Id. As a result, state courts look at state
constitutional law and decide federal questions only when state law is "not
dispositive." Id.

99. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(holding that discrimination against any group based on race will merit strict
scrutiny, even if that group has never been the subject of widespread
discrimination).
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Do you really expect state courts to start doing that in every
one of these areas of rights or Bill of Rights or other areas? I
mean courts are simply not going to do that. I think there are
good reasons, some of which have been suggested by Barry.
Luke Bierman:
What I am suggesting is that it is closer to what they actually
do in other situations. In a case called Armstrong v. Simon and
Schuster,100 a defamation case dealing with standards that we
apply for defamation. The court of appeals said, because it is not
a constitutional issue in other states, they do not look to other
states for defamation. 10 1 The court said that we are going to
resolve the standard and we are going to resolve this issue with
102
standards well established in our law.
They do not look to see what Wisconsin is doing. They do not
look to see what Texas is doing, or Montana. They approach it
from their own perspectives and I am not so much offering a
model that I would like to see, however, I think what I am trying
to do is suggest that this is the way they are doing it and that has
confused things or has caused problems or has promoted this

100. 85 N.Y.2d 373, 649 N.E.2d 825, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1995). A
criminal defense attorney representing defendants allegedly involved in a

scheme of illegal insider trading, brought suit against the writer, editor and
publisher of the book "Den of Thieves." Id. Plaintiff sought relief from
damages arising from an allegedly defamatory paragraph about his role in
insider trading scandals on Wall Street. Id. at 376, 649 N.E.2d at 826, 625
N.Y.S.2d at 478.
101. Id. at 376, 649 N.E.2d at 826, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The Armstrong
court states that the state courts of other states have "different standards for
measuring the sufficiency of claims of defamation by implication," however,
the court of appeals subsequently followed the New York standard. Id. at 381,
649 N.E.2d at 829, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
102. Id. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that "a case of
allegedly false statements of verifiable fact, with inferences flowing from those
facts, [the plaintiff] bears the burden of proving the alleged falsity as well as
the other elements of his claim." Id. at 381, 649 N.E.2d at 829-30, 625
N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
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discord because we do not see this analysis in these other kinds of
cases.
We do not see it in the general case load, when they certainly
could go out and look at what other states are doing when they
decide what the elements of negligence are, what the elements of
emotional distress, what the elements of contract law for action
are. They do not do that. I think that's reflected in the
importance they have placed on themselves.
Peter Galie:
They do that when the law in the state is not sufficiently
precedent. You make a key point here. That is a nonconstitutional area of law. The point is in the area of individual
rights we have a powerfully special circumstance in which state
courts must function in a way they do not have to function when
it comes to tort law or negligence or malpractice or things of that
sort. I mean I think that is just reality. One other point I will
make and I will shut up about that. You talk about unique state
traditions. You know, of course, there is a secret conversation we
had about this last night, I admit it. To say simply look at the
unique state tradition, you use that phrase, you know that means
nothing.
Luke Bierman:
I do not mean that the way I think you are taking it. My point
is that it is independent. They can do whatever they want with it.
Peter Galie:
You mentioned something about how the state constitutions
pre-existed the national constitution. If you look at New York
State, our constitution certainly did predate the federal
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constitution but our Bill of Rights did not. 103 The Bill of Rights
was adopted in 1821 and the debates make it very clear that they
based it on the federal model and we have changes specifically
made imitating the federal model. So, if you want to talk about
the state history what you are really suggesting is an indication
we ought to be following the federal model.
Luke Biennan:
You are not trying to sell your book, 104 are you?
Peter Galie:
I will shut up on that one.
Vincent Bonventre:
Let me respond first of all, about this stuff about uniqueness of
New York or its charter, whether it is post-dated or predated. I
do not think that gets us anywhere. I do not think this kind of
quasi-textualism argument you are making gets us anywhere. I
mean you say the provision in the New York State Constitution is
the same as the Federal Constitution. So what? What does that
have to do with anything? The provisions in neither of the
constitutions answers the question of whether there should be an
open field doctrine or whether there should be a warrant for
administrative searches. It is just not there.

103. See Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism:The New York State Court of Appeals* Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 12 (1996) (noting that written by John

Jay, New York adopted its first constitution in 1777, which was later used as a
model for the Philadelphia Convention). See also Meredith S. Katz, AttorneyGeneral of the State of New York v. One Green FourDoor Chrysler: Does the
PunislunentFit the Crime, 12 TouRo L. REv. 715, 723 (1996) (noting that in
1846, New York State adopted a Bill of Rights in its constitution).
104. Peter J. Galie, OrderedLiberty: A ConstitutionalHistor. of New York
(Fordham University Press, 1996).
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Now you say the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment 10 5 and it has given answers. And my response to
you is, yes, and so? If you are going to say that is one court
which has provided an answer, you might say, well, there are
other courts that maybe also addressed that question or will
address that question and why is it the court of appeals ought to
rely on the federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment? 10 6 If it is because the Supreme Court's decision is
wise, that is fine, however, that is an independent determination
of the court of appeals. The court of appeals independently
decided whether the Supreme Court's ruling is wise.
If the court of appeals ought to follow the Supreme Court
because of the Court's authority, they have not. They do not have
to tell New York what its constitutional provision means
regardless of what the words are. If it is that the Supreme Court
is doing the same thing, and they are kind of good at it, of course
they are not doing the same thing. They simply are not.
Even Rehnquist at his nomination hearings, 107 and
confirmation hearings to be Chief, was asked about, well, people
are complaining that the Supreme Court is not the primary
guardian of rights and liberties anymore, not the conscience of
the country anymore. ' 0 8 There are all these state courts out there
providing more protection than the Supreme Court. Rehnquist
says that is exactly the way it is supposed to be. 109 He says we
are not the primary guardians, we are not supposed to be the one
primarily responsible for safe guarding rights and liberties. 110
He says more specifically, you heard it, it is a clich6 now, that
in his view the Federal Constitution is construed by the Supreme
Court provides a minimal level. 11 1 I do not think Rehnquist just

105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106. Id.
107. 12 MERSKY & JACOBSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES NOMINATIONS

1916-1986 (1989).

108. See generally id.
109. Id.
110. Id.

111. Id. at 451. Justice Rehnquist stated:
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means minimal level that it is the floor level, that states can not
go below it. 1 12 Rehnquist also means a low level, he means a
low level of fights. 113 The Supreme Court is supposed to insist
on a low level of rights because the Supreme Court doesn't want
to interfere with state sovereignty. 114 That is because in
Rehnquist's view, and I think the view of many of the justices of
the Supreme Court, if not a majority of them, is that the Court is
always concerned about federalism, about state sovereignty,
about the state's authority to be independent. 115
Now, if the court of appeals wants to rely on the federal
Supreme Court decisions because they think uniformity is good,
well, then, hell, I think that Luke is right, then explain it. Say
that's what we are getting at. Do not start making excuses as to
why we are following them or abiding by them or why we are
not.
If uniformity is good, tell us why it is good. I have not seen the
argument at the court of appeals. What about the court of
appeals' oath to the State Constitution? Does that mean anything?
Does the State Constitution mean anything? Does it have any
independent character? If it does not, why do we have it? Why
bother having those provisions that supposedly protect rights?

The Federal Constitution certainly lays down one rule for all 50 States, and
if some States want a more stringent prohibition against searches and

seizures than that provided by the Fourth Amendment, it just makes sense
that they ought to have it. If some States are content with the Federal

provision, which everybody has to live up to, it seems to me that makes
sense for them to have that. I think it is a very healthy development.
Id. Additionally, Senator Mathias questioned Justice Rehnquist, -So you
would view the protections in the Federal Constitution as the floor and not
as the cieling?" Justice Rehnquist replied, "Oh, absolutely." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.

114. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Id.
115. See generally 12 MERSKY & JACOBSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES NOMINATIONS 1916-1986 (1989).
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And so I guess whether we are talking about textualism or we
are talking about the Supreme Court's decision-making, my
response is so what? New York is talking about a different
territory, different population. It's not bound by and it does not
need to worry about what Wyoming thinks about its decision.
New York decides for itself.
Bari , Latzer:
The question is not whether the New York Court of Appeals
has the authority to interpret the State Constitution the way they
want, you know we do not disagree on that. The issue is: what is
the reason why there is dissention on the court of appeals in the
new federalism cases? That is Professor Bierman's point that
there is more disagreement in the new federalism cases.
So the question is why is there more disagreement? My answer
is because here we have a controversial area of law and here we
have an area of law where the United States Supreme Court has
established legal rules and principles. And now the court of
appeals is being asked to reject, to repudiate, those legal rules
and principles established by the United States Supreme Court. I
would say that realistically that has to be a source of conflict on
the court of appeals. That is the source of conflict.
If you are asked to step out as a state judge and repudiate a rule
established by the United States Supreme Court, I think you
would think twice about it, too. That is the reality of it. By the
way, I do not believe you are correct that the court of appeals
does not take that into account formally when they make
decisions.
In P.J. Video, 116 I believe, when they were announcing their
interpretive guidelines for state constitutional law, did they not
say there that they take into account and have great respect for
what the United States Supreme Court has said on the questions?

116. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987) (holding that the

New York State Constitution imposes stricter standards for the issuance of a
search warrant than does the Federal Constitution).
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If they have, then that means they have formally and officially
acknowledged the role of the United States Supreme Court.117
I think both of you are being very unrealistic about the
environment in which the state courts are operating. They are not
operating in a vacuum. If this were an area where the Supreme
Court had never said anything or rights had not yet been
incorporated into due process, and the Supreme Court was
speaking only for the federal government, then I would think you
are a hundred percent correct, the court of appeals should just
ignore everybody else and decide Article 1, Section 12118 the
way they think it ought to be decided. However, that is not the
real world.
We have three decades, since the '60's, of the United States
Supreme Court speaking on these questions and developed an
entire body of law. I think before you repudiate that, a judge, it
is legitimate for a judge to think twice about repudiating that part
of that body of law.
Vincent Bonventre:
But, you know, when the court of appeals renders an
independent decision, it's not repudiating the Supreme Court's
decision, it's doing a different thing.
Barry Latzer:
It is repudiating the doctrine. It can not repudiate the Supreme
Court just as the Supreme Court cannot really repudiate what the
court of appeals is saying. However, the court of appeals is
rejecting the doctrine, the rules, and the principles that the United
States Supreme Court has established.
If you were on the court, would you not think twice before you
did that? I would.
Vincent Bonventre:
117. Id. at 301-02, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
118. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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I would not.
Barry Latzer:
I do not think there is anything wrong with the judges of court
of appeals fighting about it. I think it is understandable. That is
my point. My point is the source of the conflict is the fact that
they are repudiating established Federal Constitutional law, the
doctrine, now, not the law itself.
Luke Bierman:
Why do we not see in other areas, with regard to state issues,
non-constitutional state issues? They are unanimous ninety
percent of the time. 119 They are not looking to other states for
direction on issues that arise. This is a court under the new
jurisdictional scheme that is supposed to be taking the most
contentious and important cases. Those cases that, in theory, a
country with a national law system, in many ways, should be
seen all over the place. We do not see that with regard to those
cases.
Ban)y Latzer:
But you have answered your own question. If New Jersey
makes defamation law, it is only good in New Jersey. And if
New York makes defamation law it is only good in New York.
But if the Supreme Court says something about the First
Amendment 1 20 which implicates defamation law, it is the law
everyplace unless rejected by the states on independent state
119. See Bierman, supra note 30, at 639-40.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
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grounds. That is the answer to your question. The answer is that
New York does not have to follow New Jersey but it does have to
follow the Supreme Court until they reject them.
Vincent Bonventre:
The Supreme Court's ruling, of course, is only binding as a
floor. And so you still have a state tribunal which is obliged to
determine whether that floor is where the state's law ought to be.
And if it does not agree that the state's law ought to be at the
floor, I do not see how that is repudiating the Supreme Court.
Barry Latzer:
It is repudiating the doctrine. The day before the Scott and Keta
cases 121 were decided, did you need a warrant to search open
fields for marijuana in New York? The answer is you did not. In
fact, not only did the United States Supreme Court say you did
not need a warrant, 122 even the New York Court of Appeals said
you did not need a warrant. 123 I have forgotten the name of the
case, but there was a previous case which the New York Court of
Appeals ruled on the very question. 124 They said, themselves,
you did not need a warrant to search an open field. 125
Therefore, the law was clearly established in New York,
beyond question, that you did not need a warrant to search open
fields. The day after the Scott and Keta cases 126 you did need a
warrant. Should that lead to a debate and a fight on a court? I
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (finding that a warrantless

search is allowed because an owner of open fields enjoys no Fourth
Amendment protection).
123. See People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 523 N.E.2d 291. 528

N.Y.S.2d 15 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of an open field, even
without probable cause, was justified as a property owner does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields).
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
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think so. They are changing the law. You know what I would
compare? I would compare the new federalism cases to the nonnew federalism cases where they are making major changes in the
law.
This is what I would suggest to Professor Bierman if he wanted
to do a follow up, and let us see how much dissention and
conflict there is in those non-new federalism cases where they are
making significant changes in the law. My wager is you will find
just as much conflict. That would be my hypothesis.
Michael Hutter:
Comments on the comments? Other additional questions?
Audience Member:
I would like to steer the discussion to something else, Professor
Bonventre, you brought up in my mind. You appeared to express
some concern that what might occur within the next few years of
appointments could become increasingly a political mirror of
what has happened. Did I perceive what you said or are you
concerned that people are going to start-Vincent Bonventre:
I am not concerned. I think that would be healthy if the court
of appeals' nomination process were a little more honest than it is
now. 127 Except for Ciparick's hearing, 12 8 the court of appeals'
127. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 63 (McKinney 1996) (detailing the functions

of the Commission on Judicial Nomination in considering candidates for
appointment to the office of judge of the court of appeals by evaluating the
qualifications of candidates for appointment and, as vacancy occurs,
recommending to the governor those persons who are well qualified to hold
such judicial office).

128. Hearings Before the New York State Senate Standing Committee on
Judiciary on the Nomination of the Honorable Carmen Ciparick as Associate
Judge of the Court of Appeals, Dec. 15, 1993. See also Gary Spencer,
Conservative Look to 1994 Rulings: Prosecutors Have Reason to Be
Encouraged, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 1994, at S2. (stating that Judge Ciparick was

elevated to the state's highest court on January 4, 1994, but that her

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/3

46

Hutter et al.: Decision Making At The Court Of Appeals

1996]

DECISION MAKING AT THE COURT
OF APPEALS

49

hearings to date have largely been rubber stamped and we end up
knowing nothing about these people.
I mean they are asked the obligatory questions. Do you think
judges should make law? No, I do not. Do you think judges
should legislate? No, I do not. Will you simply apply the law?

Yes, I will. As though there is any particular law that is so clear
that they are going to be making law the very first day they step
into the hall on Eagle Street. 12 9 I think, until the Ciparick

hearing, 130 by and large these nomination hearings are a charade.
I would welcome those nomination hearings being a little more
insightful than they are right now.
I am certainly not suggesting they ought to go to the extent that
the United States Senate judiciary hearings have gone with
Bork 13 1 and some others. 132 1 think that would be a disaster, but
certainly there are legitimate questions to ask these people.
confirmation was highly contentious as 25 of 59 New York state senators
voted against her conformation as a reaction to Judge Ciparick's controversial
opinion in Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, (Sup. Ct.
1991), aff'd, 189 A.D.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1993), rei'd, 83 N.Y.2d
563, 634 N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994) (Judge Ciparick holding that
the State Constitution protects a woman's right to an abortion)): Gary Spencer,
Ciparick Faces Sharp Questionsfron Senators, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 1993, at
1 (questioning by "frustrated" state senators and assailed right-to-life
advocates over Judge Ciparick's landmark abortion rights decision); Gary
Spencer, CiparickNamed to Court of Appeals: Supreme Court Justice is First
Hispanic Nominee, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1993, at 1 (nominated by Governor
Mario Cuomo, Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick is the second woman and the first
Hispanic woman on the state's highest court).
129. The New York Court of Appeals is located at 20 Eagle Street, Albany.
New York.
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. HearingsBefore the Conunittee on the Judiciary United States Senate
on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The nomination of
Bork to the Supreme Court of the United States stirred a heated political battle.
Id. Robert H. Bork graduated University of Chicago Law School where he was
the managing editor of the Chicago Law Review. Id. at xi. Bork later served as
Solicitor General. Id. After his service as Solicitor General, Bork returned to
private practice only to leave when President Reagan appointed him to a
judgeship on the United States Court of Appeals. Id. at xii.
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Especially when we are talking about this, and, if Pataki 133
gets re-elected and, he is going to replace Titone, 134 should the
public know, and, should the Senate Judiciary Committee know
what that nominee thinks about the court of appeals' decisions,
what the nominee thinks the role of the judiciary, the role of the
state court is? Whether he thinks the court of appeals should
presume the validity of Supreme Court decisions or whether he or
she believes the court of appeals should be independent? Whether
that judge's philosophy is more pro independent individual rights
or pro government in the very open difficult, controversial cases?
Sure. I think the Senate is entitled to know and we are entitled to
know.
Luke Bierman:

On July 1, 1987, President Reagan announced his intention to nominate
Judge Bork to be an associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Id. Soon after, the Judiciary Committee, led by Joseph Biden,
announced that confirmation hearings would commence in September when
Congress returned from its summer recess. Id. Liberals opposed Bork,
especially on his positions on constitutional rights of free speech and privacy.
Id. at xiii. Conservatives subsequently attacked the liberals stressing Judge
Bork's exemplary credentials. Id. The nomination hearing began on September
15, 1987, before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at xiv. Compared to
prior nomination hearings, Bork's nomination hearing took place for nearly
five days with many acrimonious questions and testimony requiring over 750
pages. Id.
On October 6, 1987, after listening to over one hundred witnesses, the
Senate Judiciary Committee voted to recommend that the Senate reject Judge
Bork's nomination. Id. Judge Bork continued his valiant efforts to become
Justice Bork but "[oln October 23, 1987, the Senate voted to reject the
nomination of Judge Bork to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States by a vote of 58 to 42 . . . . " Id.
132. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United
States Senate on the Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
133. George E. Pataki was elected governor of New York State in 1994.
134. Joseph Vito Titone was appointed to the New York State Court of
Appeals in 1985.
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A couple of things. First, even if Pataki is defeated in '98, his
influence will be felt because he will have four appointments to
the Commission on Judicial Nomination 1 35 in addition to the
Republican nominees, the Republican appointees to that
commission. Even if he is defeated, there is certainly a possibility
for the influence remaining for a Titone appointment.
Second thing. It was not unusual, in the earlier years of this
century, anyway, at the appellate division, anyhow, for judges to
come and go. People would serve five years and then they
wouldn't be redesignated and then you would see them again five
years later reflecting the Governor making the appointment.
Titone not being reappointed, Bellacosa not being reappointed,
depending on who the Governors are, when we have judges who
are younger than their fourteen year term, the politicization is
something that is not unique or is not foreign from New York's
judicial appointment process. 136
One more thing. I just finished reading all of the Senate
confirmation hearings. Fourteen appointments, actually only
twelve I could get, the Senate does not have two. Professor
Bonventre is being much too generous of the kinds of questions
that were asked. Some of the hearings lasted as long as thirty
minutes, if that, and half of it is introducing the committee. Some
of the questions were things like, "Did you bring anybody to talk
on your behalf?" Those kind of questions. -Who do we have
here to talk?" There is nobody.
Ciparick's is unique. 137 That is for the fourteenth appointment,
there is finally a negative vote. 138 Of course the negative vote
that occurred is only because the abortion cases she had
written. 139 There is really no telling inquiry as there had been

135.
136.
137.
138.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAv § 63 (McKinney 1996).
See supra note 128
Id. (citing to a letter accompanying Judge Ciparick's confirmation

hearing, Mr. O'Brien stated that for the reasons discussed at the nomination
hearing of Judge Ciparick, she should not be confirmed).
139. Id.
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previously. You may be charitable in the assessment what these
confirmation hearings are really like.
Peter Galie:
One thing I noticed is that you did not detect any difference in
the character and collegiality of the court as a function of the
mode of selection. We did go through a change in about 1977, so
that one would have hypothesized, at least one would have
potentially thought, that it might make a difference of the
character of the people of the court. Since you make some point
about the background in some of the judges that you did not find
out I think was revealing. I thought I would mention that.
Vince, first of all, you know I am not going to just arbitrarily
select some rights issues out and say we are not going to count
those, they are aberrations. That causes all kinds of problems.
Independent of that, do you exclude those when you do the bloc
analysis, the voting record?
Vincent Bonventre:
No, it was not.
Peter Galie:
You did not exclude those. The final point about your data is
that since the real heart of the controversy of the court seems to
be not individual rights, but criminal procedure rights, it is fair to
say that, it might have been. What you did, at least later, was to
split the rights between criminal and non-criminal and look at the
record of the criminal. I think that position-Vincent Bonventre:
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I have. It is virtually the same. The same kind of change from
the Wachtler era 140 to the era immediately following his
departure, and then to these two years. It is the same.
Luke Biennan:
I did that for a couple years earlier and it does not change.
Barry Latzer:
Is there a liberation hypothesis that you are developing,
Professor Bonventre? You alluded to this Wachtler leaving.
Vincent Bonventre:
Wachtler was a towering figure at the court of appeals. I mean
lots has been written about him. Lots of us worked at the court.
Without telling any tales out of school, I think it would be
perfectly fair to say this was a man who was extraordinarily
influential and persuasive for whatever reason. This is a man who
wanted consensus and by and large he got it.
If you look at how the court voted, especially when you
contrast how the court voted throughout most of Wachtler's
tenure, and you contrast that with how it voted during Cook's 14 1
tenure, and then even the first two years of Wachtler, when he
was on the liberal kick, it was a very liberal court. And then all
of a sudden after two years of Wachtler it became a very
conservative court just like Wachtler did. Wachtler became
conservative, the court became conservative. First two years he
was very liberal, they were liberal. After that he became
conservative, they became conservative. He took that court with
him.

140. See 31 N.Y.2d v (1973). Sol Wachtler was elected to the bench on

November 7, 1972.
141. See 35 N.Y.2d v (1975) Lawrence H. Cooke was elected to the bench
on November 5, 1974.
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It is possible something else was going on at exactly the same
time that resulted in the court voting largely like Wachtler. When
he was liberal they voted like him. When he was conservative,
they voted like him. I can tell you having been there, this was a
man who was extraordinary.
Barry Latzer:
Do you see Chief Judge Kaye having similar influence in the
voting blocs that you studied or not yet?
Vincent Bonventre:
Not quite like Wachtler and all the rumblings are -- no. It is
just not the same dynamics at all.
Michael Hutter:
When you start talking about turning points, now, what you
alluded to, the recent criticism of the courts, unprecedented at
least in my lifetime, how do you see this boding the court, taking
this into account?
As perhaps -- say, for example, you have a case before the
court, you are trying to extend an individual right granted, have a
right recognized, where you are trying to have an individual right
taken away, how do you see the court now in light of the
criticism that the court has gone overboard on individual rights,
how do you see the court reacting to this, if at all?
Vincent Bonventre:
I think with some judges it just will not affect them at all. They
will go about doing their job, however well or poorly they have
been doing it before or after the criticism. I think there are
judges, unquestionably, like Judge Titone, who are so upset at
the criticism, not because he does not think there should be
criticism, but because he thinks the criticism is totally unfair.
And I think judges like Titone are going to dig in their heels, and
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they are going to be damned if another branch is going to tell
them what to do, tell him or his colleagues what to do.
On the other hand, I do not doubt that there are judges that
perhaps do not have Titone's personality and back bone that
might start bending because of this criticism. This is perfectly
legitimate, whether we agree with the criticism or not, perfectly
legitimate for the chief executive of the state to say to the high
court, "Hey, guys, you are going too far. It does not make any
sense." That is what we write about. Why shouldn't the
Governor say that? He ought to be saying that. And it seems to
me that the judges have to take that into account, at least
considering the fact an equal branch of government is telling
them they are not doing their job right, whether it affects their
decision or not, but they should be considering it.
Michael Hutter:
I think that gets back to the point that was made earlier by the
two of you, Luke especially, lack of principled decision-making
with the court. Is this something that is result-oriented decisionmaking? Do you see this now perhaps happening because of the
criticism?
Luke Bierman:
That is not necessarily new. You have written about how they
decide way too many cases; less so in the last few years.
Whether it is the Governor yelling and screaming or it is just
the way they are, what I am concerned about is the Governor
yells and screams, and we see there are changes.
We do not have papers at the court of appeals the way we do at
the Supreme Court many years later. It becomes more difficult to
try to figure out what is going on. These things are important not
just to us, but to the citizens of the state. Seems to me that they
should know this stuff, it should be out there more prominently
than it is.
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Vincent Bonventre:
I mention the possibility of a judge or two digging in his or her
heels. Anything is possible. A judge incurring favor with the
Governor. He could make one of them chief at some point.
Michael Hutter:
At least three judges have their fourteen year terms coming up
and they will have another fourteen years. 142
Vincent Bonventre:
That is right.
Mr. Kerman:
Michael Kerman with the Department of State. Have there been

earlier scandals involving the court as juicy as Wachtler's and has
there been a period of criticism immediately thereafter?
Vincent Bonventre:
I remember being asked that question. There was a real
scandal. Somebody on the court who was stealing or -- it was
years ago. There was a problem with Fuchsberg. 143 He was
accused of having sat on cases in which he had a vested financial
interest. 144 Then he was also accused of somebody else writing
his papers. But before that, in the last century, there actually was
a judge who was to be impeached.
Luke Bierman:

142. In 1981, Hon. Howard A. Levine was elected to the court of appeals.
Hon. Judith S. Kaye and Hon. Richard D. Simons were appointed to the court
by Governor Cuomo in 1983. In 1985 Hon. Vito J. Titone was appointed to
the court by Governor Cuomo followed by Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa in 1987.
143. In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.2d 639 (N.Y. Ct. Jud. 1978).
144. Id.
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I remember reading about it. The end of the last century, the
beginning of this century.
Vincent Bonventre:
They are rare, very, very rare in the history of the court.
Mr. Kerman:
Did they lead to any increased criticism of the court such as we
are having now?
Vincent Bonventre:
Are you suggesting that Wachtler's debacle led to the criticism?
Mr. Kernman:
Yes. I am suggesting that.
Vincent Bonventre:
I was very glad to criticize the court before Wachtler left.
Luke Bierman:
There has been criticism. In the early years of the century the
worker's compensation cases caused all kinds of problems. That
was a big deal. Criticism of the court is nothing new and it
should not be. They are a political institution and we should
criticize and praise the political institutions when it's appropriate.
Mr. Kerman:
Has the scandal opened up the judicial selection process to
make that more contentious as exposing the court to some
humanity questions?
Vincent Bonventre:
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I do not know. I have not seen that.
Michael Hutter:
Along those lines, has Governor Pataki made any new
appointments to the court of appeals' Screening Committee at this
point?
Luke Bierman:
I actually have requested that information from the Commission
and counsel and have not gotten any response. The way the
Commission is structured there are appointments every year. The
Governor gets one each year. I requested that information. I
cannot answer. I have not seen any news reports.
Michael Hutter:
Our time is up. I would like to thank very much Vin Bonventre
and Luke Bierman and the audience's obvious rapt attention to
their talks. They have been very enlightening.
Thank you very much again.
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